A common bit of financial wisdom says that there is no such thing as a good or bad stock, only a good or bad price. Strong companies can be overvalued and weak companies can be undervalued, so what matters is not only the ultimate profitability of the company but what you pay for your share of it.
Much the same applies to poker, where there is very little you get to do for free. Even checking or folding comes at the “price” of a lost opportunity. Checking when you could have profitably bluffed or bet for value costs you money just as surely as does folding the best hand or calling from behind.
It’s a common mistake for poker players to focus only on the potential upside or downside of a wager and not pay enough attention to the price. This often leads to seemingly contradictory mistakes of sometimes paying too high of a price to play speculative hands and other times declining a very good price to play so-called “trouble hands.”
Preflop, many players use the concept of implied odds to justify raising or calling with weak hands. “If I flop well, they’ll never see it coming, and I’ll win a big pot!” they tell themselves. Then, anticipating the excitement and monetary reward of that big pot, they make the call with {10-Clubs}{7-Clubs}.
Of course it’s nice to win big pots, and {10-}{7-}-suited does in fact have the potential to make a well-concealed monster hand. At no point, though, has our imaginary player considered the price he is paying for a shot at making that monster hand.
Often that is because the price seems small compared to the potential payoff. Perhaps you pay just $8 or $10 in a $1/$2 no-limit game to see a flop. That seems miniscule compared to the $200 or more you could win if you flop two pair, trips, or even a straight or flush.
Let’s call this the “Starbucks phenomenon.” Seemingly trivial costs — “Sure, $3 is a lot of money for coffee, but in the grand scheme of things it isn’t really a lot of money” — add up over time. Your odds of flopping two pair or better with {10-}{7-}-suited are around 5%, which means that for every time you flop that strong hand, there will be 19 times you do not. If you pay $8 on each of those 19 occasions, then that’s $152 you need to recoup on that 20th occasion before you are in the black on this investment.
On top of that, $8 is not necessarily the only or final price. Sometimes you call that $8 just to see someone reraise behind you, forcing you to pay even more or forfeit your $8 without ever seeing the flop.
Other times you flop two pair and lose anyway. For example, if you get your money in with {10-}{7-} against {A-}{A-} on a {10-}{7-}{3-} rainbow flop, you’ll lose about 25% of the time.
Far more frequently than flopping two pair, you’ll flop a draw or a single pair. Then you’ll be faced with the prospect of calling additional bets trying to improve your hand or hoping that it can win unimproved.
Meanwhile, there are other situations where poker players actually overlook the fact that they are getting an extremely good price. In a tournament with antes, a player in the big blind facing a min-raise can easily be getting 4-to-1 or 5-to-1 on a call. At that price, even a lot of so-called “junk hands” are worth playing.
It’s true that two-thirds of the time you’ll flop nothing and end up check-folding to a continuation bet. And some of the times you do get a piece of the flop, you’ll still lose the pot. At 5-to-1, though, you can afford to give up on a lot of flops and still come out ahead on your preflop call. Rather than thinking of {Q-}{7-}-offsuit as a terminably unplayable hand, think of it as a generally bad investment but a bargain at the right price.
The most blatant example of this failure to recognize a good price occurs when players are faced with an all-in decision in a tournament. Although it is correct to place some value on your survival, many players take it to an extreme. The price — potential elimination from the tournament — seems high, but the potential reward in terms of chips won could easily be high enough to justify it. After all, having more chips is also a way of protecting yourself in future situations and may be the key to surviving a cooler or bad beat later in the tournament.
Admittedly, thinking in terms of price requires more effort, including some study away from the table, than just going with your gut about whether a hand feels like a winner. This kind of hard work, however, is what will separate you from your opponents. When they are the ones who pay too high of a price to play their hands, then you are the one who profits.
If you play tournament poker on a regular basis you need to learn quickly how to defend your blinds, because they are going to come under attack from late position openers more than you would care to imagine.
Defending against a steal attempt is one area with which many poker players struggle, mainly because they either do not defend enough and have their stacks eaten up by their aggressive opponents, or they defend too liberally and have to play the rest of the hand out of position with what is often a relatively weak holding.
Finding the perfect balance of calling, folding, or reraising from this position comes with experience and can take some time to learn. Hopefully by the time you have finished reading this article you will have more knowledge about the art of defending your blinds.
For the most part, three-betting a steal attempt is going to be preferred over calling and hoping to connect with the flop. While the latter is a viable option in some cases, more often than not you’re going to be left holding a weak hand while also playing from out of position and without the initiative in the hand. That last point is important because having the initiative in the hand — in the form of being the aggressor — gives you many more options postflop and makes your life much easier in the long run.
Let’s consider the situation further by making cases for both three-betting and calling when you’re facing a steal attempt.
When to Three-Bet a Steal Attempt
Responding to a steal with a reraise should be your default line. If your hand is strong enough to play out of position then it should be strong enough to three-bet.
Obviously, the main reason to three-bet would be for value because you have a strong hand. Holding hands such as {K-Spades}{Q-Spades}, {10-}{10-} or better, or {A-Diamonds}{Q-Clubs} when facing a steal should mean a mandatory reraise. You can also widen your three-betting range if your opponent is stealing with a wide range of hands.
The next couple reasons for three-betting are all player specific, so you will have either had to make some notes on your opponents’ tendencies, be using a HUD (Heads-Up Display) if playing online, or have a great memory.
If your opponent folds to a lot of three-bets — which means the player is stealing with a wide range of hands — then feel free to three-bet until the cows come home. Facing an opponent who folds a lot preflop after opening the betting means you can three-bet with a much wider range of hands than you normally would.
Likewise, if your opponent often calls a three-bet but then plays fit-or-fold on the flop, you should be three-betting and then continuation betting most flops to take the pot away from him.
Finally, make a note of what sort of hands your stealing opponent has when calling reraises. If they are hands that are easily dominated such as {A-Diamonds}{3-Diamonds} and {J-Clubs}{8-Hearts}, then start three-betting with hands that would dominate that range like {A-Clubs}{9-Clubs} or {Q-Hearts}{J-Hearts}.
When to Call a Steal Attempt
Although I’d advocate three-betting the majority of the time you’re going to defend against a late position steal attempt, there are times when calling could be the correct play.
One example of a good time to call instead of three-betting would be if you had a powerhouse hand such as {A-Spades}{K-Spades}, {K-Diamonds}{K-Hearts}, or {A-Spades}{A-Diamonds} and the stealer has been folding to a high percentage of reraises. In this spot you can call to keep your opponent in the hand, then try to extract some value postflop.
Another reason to call would be if you’re playing deep-stacked and hold something like a small or medium pocket pair or a suited ace where the potential to flop an absolute monster is there, but at the same time you don’t want to be bloating the pot with the weaker part of your range while being out of position at the same time.
A third reason to defend with just a call would be if your opponent steals frequently but then calls a lot of three-bets. Here you probably don’t want to three-bet unless you have a solid hand, but you still want to get into the pot with an opponent who is opening wide.
Playing out of the blinds against a steal can often be tricky, yet it can also be a profitable proposition. Try and take the preflop initiative as often as you can if you’re going to defend your blinds, but ensure that you have notes or a read on the person trying to steal from you to help avoid slip-ups after the flop.
Dealing with donk bets is an important skill. Often, donk bets are among the most exploitable plays that live no-limit players make. They are an unnatural action that players tend to take in certain, clearly defined circumstances. Because these circumstances are fairly well-defined, a donk bet often tells you a lot more about what your opponent is holding than other types of bets.
For the record, there's nothing inherently true about this. Donk bets could be just as well-balanced and information-hiding as any other type of bet. It's just that in practice, they aren't.
This hand is one example of how I interpreted and reacted to a donk bet. Stacks are about $400 effective. My opponent is a regular $2-$5 type player.
A player limped from three off the button. I made it $20 to go with T♣9♣. The small blind called, as did the limper. There was $65 in the pot and about $380 behind.
The flop came Q♦9♥7♥.
This is a fairly dynamic flop that many hands hit, but few hit hard. My typical plan on a board like this one is to bet the flop, expecting to get called (because so many hands hit this flop). Then if the turn card is a brick, I barrel again and expect most of the hands that called on the flop to drop out.
The fact that I hold middle pair is a bit of a wrinkle, since I have some showdown value. But in this situation I'm more inclined to look at my hand as "equity if called" rather than "showdown value", since even if I'm ahead on the turn, my opponents' ranges will have plenty of equity against me. I'm happy to bet my hand and hope for folds.
My opponents checked, and I bet $45 into the $65 pot. I would normally bet a little bit bigger in this situation, but with the shallower-than-normal stacks I wanted to be able to bet the turn big and still leave behind a credible barrel for the river.
The small blind called, and the limper folded. There's $155 in the pot and $335 behind.
The turn is the 2♣.
My opponent donk bets $75.
In this particular situation, I think the donk bet is very likely to mean that my opponent holds a queen. He's betting out on this draw-heavy board to prevent me from taking a free card with a draw. It's also possible that my opponent is the one with the draw, and he's trying to "set his price" by betting small to prevent me from betting big.
I think this is relatively unlikely for two reasons. First, I would expect the bet to be a little smaller in that case. Since I bet $45 on the last round, a "set your price" bet I'd expect to come in around $40-$60. Second, players tend to do this only with the really good draws, since they don't mind being bet off their gutshots. Good draws are relatively rare by their nature.
Overall, I think my equity profile against this range is pretty poor. Mostly I think I'm up against a better pair. When I'm up against a draw, it's going to be the sort that has 35 to 50% equity against my hand.
I could call. If I did that, I would be hoping one of two things happens. First, obviously, is that I hit my hand and draw out on top pair. That's about a 10% chance. Second, I would hope for an obvious draw-completing card like a heart or maybe a jack or king. If my opponent showed scared of that card, I'd bluff.
In some circumstances, I'd think this plan would make sense. But here I don't like it. I don't think stacks are deep enough. The pot at that point would be $305, and I'd have only $260 behind. This is nearly a pot-sized bet, which should be enough to get a fold. But I'm concerned about two things. First, my opponent could try to make a blocking bet on a scary river, in which case I'm now forced to raise an amount significantly less than pot.
Second, even absent a blocking bet, the absolute amount of the bet, $260, is small enough that many $2-$5 players will let their curiosity get the best of them and call it off. I am, after all, trying to get players off a range of hands that is already established as fairly good going into the river card.
I don't like raising either for similar reasons. My opponent's range is fairly strong, $260 isn't a big enough deterrent, and on the turn my opponent can put me on a draw if I shove.
So I folded. With deeper stacks and perhaps also a read that my opponent was prone to fold top pair when challenged in a big pot, I would consider either calling or raising the turn. In either case, my plan would be to win the pot ultimately with a big river bluff.
old 2+2 post, just came across it in my bookmarks:
So improve, improve & improve
there's no magic anti-variance wand (well, besides NOT posting on 2+2 while on the bubble in a half dozen tournaments ). If you give, you gotta take from somewhere else.
To a certain extent, optimum playing style is determined by our opponents. We're only 1 player at a table of 6, 9 or 10 people. There's only a limited degree to which we can impose our will on the table. If you play a nitty 6/3/1 style at 400NL you're going to be at best, an FPP pro. OTOH, playing LAG style is going to be difficult at 2NL because you can't push anyone off a hand, ever.
Obviously there is a range of profitable styles. If you are better than your opponents then playing more hands and playing them aggressively gives you more opportunity to take their monies. This too is a balancing act - 100% VPIP is a fun exercise against donks but not conducive to long term success.
TAG is often considered a "happy medium" between long term profitability and short term variance. Trying to reduce variance from TAG may work on a case by case basis, but if you take a systematic approach then you become a nit.
Being a nit can be a viable strategy, particularly against spewtards who don't adjust against nut peddlers. However, while nits seldom have really bad days, they also never have spectacular days either. And since they basically never outplay their opponents and rely almost entirely on showdown value they're actually at the mercy of variance to a tremendous degree, particularly in the long term. If you only play your cards, then you're entirely dependent on your cards being good. Because they play so few hands, every hand they play is critical. A couple big suck-outs or coolers in a row is absolutely devastating.
Trying to limit variance any other way than improving your game usually just winds up being counter-productive and increasing your potential to run bad long term.
A new player entered the game and straddled for $10 on the button. The action begins with the under the gun player in these straddled pots, then if there’s no raise it skips the button and the straddle acts last.
Everyone folded to the small blind, a young Asian guy who was remarkably weak-tight after the flop. He raised to $20, which given my experience with him so far I thought he would do with a wide range of hands. I 3-bet to $60 from the big blind with Q♣J♣. The straddle folded, and the small blind called. We both had about $1,000 behind.
The flop was A♠9♥4♠. He checked, and I checked.
The turn was the T♥. He bet out for $35 in the $130 pot, and I raised to $135. He acted pained by the raise and eventually folded.
It’s far from automatic for me to 3-bet with Q-J suited in the big blind, but in this situation I think it’s mandatory. My 3-bet gets more money into the pot with position against a weak-tight player who is easy to read postflop—and easy to get to fold. And it also pressures the button straddle to fold, which is clearly better than allowing him to call just $10 and see a flop.
I could have bet the flop, but I often like to use delayed c-bet tactics on relatively static, ace-high boards like this one. Against a weak-tight player, I shouldn’t need three betting rounds to get him to fold most of his hands. I can check it back on the flop and still credibly rep an ace with turn and river bets.
If I check it back on the flop, two good things can happen on the turn. First, my opponent can make an unusually large bet which would tip me off that he has a strong hand. This can save me two or even three barrels.
Second, my opponent can make an unusually small bet which would tip me off that he’s willing to fold. And not only does it give me that information, but the small bet also sweetens the pot for me when I eventually steal it.
I was happy, of course, to see the turn card give me an open-ended straight draw. But when my weak-tight opponent bets just $35 into a $130 pot, I would rip off a raise with any two cards. I suspect he folded an ace. If I had simply bet the flop, then he would have called with his ace. I wouldn’t know if he had a hand like A-K or A-Q or A-9 that he wouldn’t be folding, or if he had a weak ace or a flush draw that he would fold on the turn.
Betting the flop is fine, of course, but when your opponents are predictable, weak, and willing to give away information, sometimes it’s better to delay the bet and let the hand develop before taking decisive action.
Comments
One of the problems here is sample size for steal attempts no?
agreed. i thought that as well. author should have mentioned that.
Have I missed something or have you been gone for years? Welcome back!