Short & Interesting NLHE Strategy Posts

Bfillmaff

This thread is for sharing any short and sweet strategy related posts. I'll make an effort to add to this every few days or so.

To kick this off I will blatantly steal today's "Hand of the Week" from one of my favorites, Mr. Ed Miller. (*with credit of course - click here for the original article.)

A Turn Barrel With An Unexpected Result
Hand Of The Week #6

This hand is from a $2-$5 no-limit game in Las Vegas. Stacks are about $500 effective.

I write about the concept in this hand frequently. But it's a vital part of my strategy, and it came up yet again in normal play, so I figured I'd write again about it.

A recreational tourist player limped under the gun. I made it $20 from middle position with 7♦6♦. Everyone folded to the limper who called.

The flop came T♣7♠3♥

My opponent checked, and I bet $30. One could make an argument for checking back with middle pair, but I always bet with position on a flop like this one against a typical (i.e., generally passive) recreational player. I can get called by worse. Also I'm setting up opportunities later in the hand to fold out better. I'm not worried about getting check-raise bluffed.

My opponent called. The turn was the Q♣. My opponent checked.

I bet $90. I'm turning my pair into a bluff. I could be ahead, but I could also easily be behind to a ten, a better seven, or a pair like 9-9. It's difficult, however, for my opponent to hold a hand better than a pair of tens here. Because the board is disjointed, two pair hands are unlikely unless my opponent is playing nearly every starting hand (which he wasn't). Sets are always a long shot. And he'd have to have called the flop with a hand like A-Q or K-Q to have a queen. This is certainly possible, but it's just a small portion of his total range of hands.

If he calls, I plan to use live read information during his call to determine whether to bluff the river. This is one reason I shaded my turn bet on the big side. If I bet small, my opponent is both more likely to call with a ten and more likely to do so without much thought. He's more likely to keep his normal rhythm of play, which gives me less information.

If I bet like I mean business, my recreational opponent is more likely to react in a way that tells me how he feels about his hand. I can fairly reliably in a significant percentage of cases tell the difference between a call with A-Q and a call with A-T or even T-9. The A-Q calls will be made more quickly and with a higher degree of relaxation.

Anyway, all that analysis became moot as my opponent check-raised me to $220. I folded. He most likely held Q-T or flopped a set.

There are two major ideas in this hand. First, flops like T-7-3 rainbow are great ones to fire two or even three barrels on. It's just plain hard to make a good-looking hand on a board like this one, and many players will abandon almost everything by the river. The queen overcard on the turn is an ideal barrel card, so I would rarely pass on the opportunity to fire again.

In this particular hand, it's possible I got bluffed, but more likely (given the way most folks play at $2-$5) that my opponent held two pair or better. Note that by raising the turn, my opponent saved me the embarrassment of firing the river and getting snapped off. As I said above, it's not a lock that I would fire the river, but because I can expect most players to raise two pair or stronger by the turn, if the hand does get to the river I'm likely looking at a range of one pair hands. This is a range I might want to bluff against.

The second idea is about live reads. Much of my live no-limit game is about putting people into slightly uncomfortable situations and then watching them react. There is usually a lot of information in the reaction--information that I'd miss out on if I didn't push the envelope.

Bfillmaff

Here's another one - This one came from facebook and is more of just a thinking exercise, but I thought it was interesting:

Think abstract, and with random cards:

The pot is 20. The flop comes. My opponent checks, and I bet 10 (half pot). Half the time my opponent folds, and half the time he calls.

Say he calls. The pot is 40. The turn comes. My opponent checks, and I bet 20. Again, he folds half the time and calls half the time.

Say he calls again. The pot is 80. The river comes. My opponent checks, and I bet 40. One more time, he folds half the time and calls half the time.

If my opponent and I play ten thousand hands using these strategies, who do you think comes out ahead?

bonus points, from the comments:

For the people who are saying that players who call down are ATMs, change the assumptions a little. Now the player raises sometimes with good hands like sets, two pair, top pairs. How does that change things?

Bfillmaff

Good one on Cardrunners re: Phil Galfond:

(link)

Ten Pieces of Phil Galfond Wisdom

I was browsing some old Phil Galfond posts and decided to compile some of the advice he has posted on 2+2 in the past. Here are 10 snippets from his posts:

1. Until I'm in desperate need of money and have to grind a bunch, forcing myself to play is always a bad idea. Both financially and emotionally.

2. Rules and formulas are great for SNGs, but not the best way to play deepstack nlhe,

3. Durrrr opened my mind to thinking about situations completely differently. I remember one time when he was discussing a hand with h@ll in front of me, where he had something like weak top pair and was facing a big river bet. He was like, 'I think a call is better than a fold' and I thought to myself, 'yeah I agree' and then he said 'but I would shove' and I exploded. I realized that you should think of every possible option you have in nlhe. You usually have a ton of them.

4. Every time the action is to you, it's an opportunity for you to make the perfect play. Thinking about poker that way is great for your game.

5. I think the three most important areas of intelligence in regards to poker are logic, probability, psychology. They actually are pretty close in order of importance, and change depending on game structure.

6. I absolutely believe that your personality affects the way you play poker. I'm a very passive person by nature. I don't like to cause trouble or upset people, and I'm very non-confrontational. It took me a very long time to push my level of poker aggression to the point it is at now, still a bit lower than it should be IMO.

7. A lot of people don't get the most out of coaching because they ask the wrong questions.

8. Brian Townsend always wins allins, which is a tough style to counter.

9. Against 99% of opponents, you don't have to worry about balancing your bluffs that much.

10. Game theory is important to understand, but not so useful in practice (in most games). Just make sure you aren't using game theory to justify bad plays. If you bluff a river against a station, don't think after he calls with midpair "well he's an idiot and I'm making money in the long run since I bluff there 10% of the time" You are making money in the long run if you bluff 10% of the time there. You probably would make more money if you bluffed 2%

pkrfce9

Kudos to you, sir.

pkrfce9

I need moar!

If I had 3 of these per day, I wouldn't feel a need to troll trigs.










P.S. THAT'S RIGHT FUCKERS!

trigs

pkrfce9 wrote: »

I need moar!

If I had 3 of these per day, I wouldn't feel a need to troll trigs.










P.S. THAT'S RIGHT FUCKERS!

lol, well here are a couple more. pretty basic and nothing special. i wasn't originally going to post them, but since you so desperately need them...

An Introduction to Bet-Timing Poker Tells | PokerNews

Understanding What It Means to Be Pot Commited

Bfillmaff

trigs wrote: »

lol, well here are a couple more. pretty basic and nothing special. i wasn't originally going to post them, but since you so desperately need them...

An Introduction to Bet-Timing Poker Tells | PokerNews

Understanding What It Means to Be Pot Commited

quoted trig's articles to keep the format going:

An Introduction to Bet-Timing Poker Tells

When you are sitting at a poker table involved in a hand, how much time do you take when you check, call, or bet? Do you act more quickly in certain situations, and more slowly in others?

Beginning poker players have all sorts of little behaviors that can give away their hand strength. This is also true for decent players who don’t play often and players who don’t take the game seriously. One of the biggest information “leaks” comes in the form of bet-timing. Bet-timing refers to how long a player takes to make an action — how long it takes a player to check, call, or bet.

Here is a summary of some of the major ways beginning no-limit poker players can give away their hand strength with the time they take to act.

1. The time it takes to check
New poker players can sometimes give away information about their hands by how long it takes them to check in certain situations. Here are a couple of examples of how check-timing can reveal hand strength.

The preflop raiser bets the flop and is called by his lone opponent. On the turn, his opponent checks and the pre-flop raiser checks behind immediately. This quick check-behind pattern will usually represent a player who has a weak-to-medium strength hand. Often it will mean the player has “given up” on the hand after his continuation bet was called. If this player had a strong or very strong hand, he will usually at least consider the best play to make, even if the player decides the best play is to check.

Another example: The non-aggressor in the hand calls a continuation bet on the flop. On the turn, the non-aggressor is first to act and takes a long time before finally checking. For most amateur players, a long time taken to check is defensive in nature and will usually mean a weak or medium-strength hand. This is also related to the opposite pattern many recreational players have of checking immediately with a strong hand so as not to present an obstacle to the aggressor continuing to bet.

2. The time it takes to call
The time it takes a player to call is probably one of the most important bet-timing tells. An immediate call will usually mean that a player has a hand that is obviously worth a call but obviously not worth a raise. This will usually mean you can eliminate the strongest hands from that player’s range. Here are a couple of examples of how this particular tell can play out.

The preflop raiser bets a flop of :7h :9s :kd . His opponent calls immediately. The immediate call, assuming it’s from a recreational player, will usually let you rule out a lot of hands on such a board, including sets and maybe even {A-}{K-} and {K-}{Q-}. This is because if the player had any of those hands he would at least consider a raise (even if he ultimately decides just to call).

In many situations, an immediate call will make a draw more likely than a made hand. For instance, let’s say a tight, predictable recreational player calls a fairly large bet immediately on a turn board of :7s :8s :2h :4d . This immediate call will more often be a draw, because a tight, predictable player will not immediately call a big bet with one-pair type hands. (The main exception to this is when facing a very aggressive opponent; many players will make immediate calls with hands they usually wouldn’t when facing a very ”aggro” opponent.)

If the caller had a one-pair hand like {A-}{8-}, {9-}{9-}, {10-}{10-}, or {J-}{J-}, he would usually want to think for a moment about whether calling, folding, or raising was the right play. His hand is not immediately and obviously worth a call. Also, if this player had a set or two pair, he would also be likely to consider a raise for a little bit. For all of these reasons, a strong draw is more likely on this board when this player calls immediately.


3. The time it takes to bet
In a lot of situations, and for a lot of players, an immediate bet or raise can increase the chances that the bet is a bluff. This is mainly due to the fact that players with strong hands usually want to think for a moment or two about how to best play the hand, because players with strong hands are usually focused on maximizing value.

Another contributing factor: bluffers on the turn or the river often know that betting is their only way to win, so they don’t have as much incentive to think about the size of the bet. Bluffers also like to convey confidence, and a quick, “confident” bet can be one way of communicating that idea.

This tendency can show up with preflop raises. A lot of times, players in late position will raise immediately with weak hands, whereas with premium hands they’ll take a couple seconds. They are ready to raise automatically with almost any two cards in late position when it is folded to them. When they actually look down at a premium hand, though, there can be a slight incentive to take some time and maybe even appear uncertain about the situation.

An immediate bet can be especially suspicious when a new card changes the hand possibilities a lot. For instance, say the preflop raiser bets the flop and turn, then by the river the board is :5h :8s :jc :6h :4d and the aggressor makes a big bet immediately. If this player really had a strong hand (like a set or the straight), it is likely he’d want to think for a couple moments about the best bet to make and how the river may have affected the situation. A lot of times, especially for inexperienced players, a quick bet on the river will occur in cases when the player has shown aggression throughout the hand and knows he has to fire one last bet to win.

Remember to observe opponents first
As with all poker tells, bet-timing tells are usually only going to be valuable if you’ve already observed a player having that behavioral pattern. For instance, if you know a player always acts quickly no matter what he has, these bet-timing patterns probably wouldn’t be very useful for him.

Ideally, you’ll want to witness the patterns being present in a specific player before making decisions based on them. Most of these bet-timing patterns will mainly be seen in inexperienced, non-serious players. Good players will have more balanced, unreadable (or even tricky) behaviors.

The most important thing for beginning poker players is to realize that bet-timing behavior can influence your opponent's actions. When you start playing regularly, it is important to not act too quickly or you risk giving away important information about your hand.

Understanding What It Means to Be “Pot Committed”

“I had to call… I was pot committed!”

One of the more commonly uttered justifications for suspect decisions in poker is for players to claim they were “pot committed” in a hand when in they really weren’t. It’s a concept many think they understand, but sometimes they misapply it or are mistaken. But it’s one well worth learning, particularly when playing “big bet” games like no-limit hold’em and pot-limit Omaha in which bets on successive streets can quickly transform a small skirmish into major melee.

The Point of No Return
Generally speaking, being pot committed means having arrived at a point in a poker hand at which folding to any bet or raise has become an incorrect play. Such a situation is determined by pot odds and how those odds compare to your chances of winning a hand.

It isn’t exactly the same, but being pot committed is sometimes likened to reaching a kind of “point of no return” such as might arise other contexts. Take the situation of opposing factions building toward conflict who make declarations suggesting a particular action or advancement necessarily removes peaceful alternatives. For example, when Julius Caesar led a legion southward toward Rome and crossed the Rubicon river, that action signaled an inexorable commitment to war, with the phrase “crossing the Rubicon” later coming to represent just such a commitment.

Military strategists have long discussed the “Rubicon” example and the mindset it represents, in particular the way committing to such an action necessarily reduces options going forward, including the one to avoid conflict altogether. A possible consequence of such thinking can be false rationalizations to support the decision after the fact — that is, after crossing the “Rubicon” (or some other “point of no return”) to avoid considering alternatives thereafter that might still exist but have been ruled out by the earlier-declared commitment.

In poker, players sometimes mistakenly describe themselves as having been “pot committed” as a justification for going all the way with a hand when they didn’t actually have to do so. Betting chips early in a hand sometimes makes it more difficult for some players to fold later on and concede losing those chips they’ve bet. Thus any bet or raise or call they make becomes justification for committing to battle for a pot to the very end... even if their opponent has assembled a much stronger “army” against them.

But just as in military strategy, it is generally not desirable in poker to seek situations in which you lessen your available options. Players in tournaments prefer amassing big stacks precisely because of the flexibility it gives them when playing hands, whereas those with short stacks find their options reduced. The same goes for cash games, in which those with bigger stacks can be more creative than those with less. One shouldn’t, then, actively look to become pot committed unless the situation is favorable for doing so — e.g., when holding a strong hand that rates to be better than an opponent’s, or when facing pot odds that make committing the rest of one’s stack correct.

A Math Problem in Which All Options Have Been Subtracted Away But One
To describe an extreme example, say you lose a big hand early in a full ring (nine-handed) no-limit hold’em tournament that knocks you back to just 1,000 chips at a time when the blinds are 400/800 with a 100 ante. Making matters worse, on the following hand you are in the big blind, meaning you only have 100 left after posting the ante and big blind. A player in middle position then raises and all fold around.

The action is on you. And you hold :8s :3h

Here is an obvious example of being pot committed. The blinds and antes total 2,100, and after your opponent raises you have but 100 left to call, making the effective stacks between the two of you just 100. That means you are facing calling 100 to win a pot of 2,200 — that’s pot odds of 22-to-1.

Even if your opponent holds :as :ah and has an 88.3% chance of beating you (according to the PokerNews Odds Calculator), that’s still just over a 7-to-1 advantage. In other words, mathematically speaking, you’re “priced in” to call no matter what two cards your opponent has. You are, as they say, pot committed.

Of course, you don’t have to call. The option to fold is still available to you, even if doing so would be foolhardy given how that would leave you even less likely to recover. But since you genuinely are pot committed, you should.


That’s a simple and relatively rare example, though. More often your decisions will be less cut-and-dry, although understanding how to calculate pot odds and thus determine whether or not committing your last chips is mathematically correct will help a great deal when making them.

Having Committed Chips ≠ Being Pot Committed
Do note, however, that being pot committed has to do with pot odds and how they compare to your chances of winning, not with how much of your stack you have already committed in pursuit of winning a pot. In the above example, you are not pot committed because you have already committed 900 chips (the big blind and ante) and have but 100 left. You are pot committed because of the pot odds being offered to you and your chances of winning the hand with :8s :3h .


Sometimes pot odds dictate it's time to commit
It is a common mistake to consider committing a high percentage of chips in one’s stack already as causing one to be pot committed and thus without options when it comes to deciding what to do with the rest. Those two circumstances often coincide, but you shouldn't believe yourself obligated to put the last of your stack in just because you have already bet a certain amount before.

Again to fashion a somewhat obvious example, let’s say I play a hand recklessly and keep calling an opponent’s bets all of the way down to the river as I crazily chase a straight draw. I start the hand with 1,000 chips holding :5s :4d and call an opponent’s raise to 200. The flop comes :ad :6c :3h and I call another bet of 300. The turn is the :jc , my opponent bets 400, and I call again, leaving myself just 100 chips. Then the river brings the :qd and my opponent bets one more time, enough to put me all in.

I’ve played the hand miserably, spewing 900 chips from my starting stack of 1,000 chasing that straight. But calling the last 100 here would be even worse. I’m not pot committed because of the chips I’ve already bet. I might be pot committed if I thought my chance of winning the hand if I called were better than the approximately 20-to-1 pot odds I was facing — but with just five-high, I don’t.

Sometimes we do want to be pot committed, say in a tournament in which we are down to a short stack and finally get dealt a premium hand like {K-}{K-} or {A-}{A-}. Then we want to get all of our chips in the middle, and thus might bet in a way that increases the likelihood we’ll be getting the remainder of our stack in sooner than later.

But generally speaking, unless you know you are getting favorable pot odds given the hand you hold and it’s chances of being best, being pot committed isn’t desirable. You want to have the option to fold available to you, especially in a tournament when doing so enables you to continue.

Bfillmaff

From a heads up hand in an EPT event. link

The Scenario

You have a slight chip lead and you are heads-up for a major tournament title.

You are dealt :6h :3h on the button and decide to min-raise to 500,000. The big blind three-bets to 1,250,000.

You call and the flop comes :js :7h :5d. Your opponent bets small, only 625,000 and you decide to call. The turn is the :9h and your opponent bets again, this time 1,325,000.

Your opponent has about 9,300,000 left and you are sitting with 10,800,000 million.

The Questions

What do you do with your double gut shot and flush draw? Do you move all in now or take another card? What do you do if you miss on the river and your opponent checks?

The Argument For Shoving

The best reason to shove is because at the moment, you have some fold equity. After all, you are still holding six-high and even though you may have up to 15 outs to win the pot, you don’t really want to rely on making your hand when you have the possibility of winning without a showdown.

Furthermore, if you do decide to call and evaluate the river, you may wind up having trouble getting value out of your hand. Your opponent may give up if he was bluffing, seeing as you just called two streets or he may become scared when a heart or a four-liner to a straight hits the board and refuse to pay you off.

Because you are looking at a draw-heavy board, shoving also has the added benefit of folding out better draws than yours. Bigger heart and straight draws will suddenly be getting a terrible price to continue, allowing your small draw to avoid disaster.

Your opponent has 9,300,000 million (37 big blinds) remaining and assuming he folds to a shove, you will be stacked with 17,200,000 million (68 big blinds). That’s a nearly 2-1 chip advantage that will allow you to apply pressure for the duration of the match.

The Argument For Calling

Let’s look at the action so far. Your opponent three-bet to 1,250,000 preflop, bet 625,000 on the flop and then followed that up with 1,325,000 on the turn. Doesn’t it seem like he may be trying to induce a raise?

Given the current stack sizes, a shove could be considered overkill. The pot only has 5,135,000 in it and you’d be risking an additional 10,625,000 to win it. If you get called and lose, you’ll be left with only 1,500,000 (6 big blinds).

But what hands actually call a shove of that size? You are certainly getting called by all strong hands, such as sets, two pair, straights and overpairs. You may even get hero called by most jacks, simply because the board is so draw heavy. Even if you get called by a draw, it will usually be a better one than you are currently holding. Don’t forget that you’re only holding six high.

Calling, however, leaves you with options on the river regardless of what comes. If you hit your draw and your opponent checks, you can go ahead and bet for value. Something around the size of the pot that will leave your opponent with just enough to give him false hope. If you miss your draw and your opponent bets, you can comfortably fold knowing you’ve salvaged your tournament. If you miss and your opponent checks, you can decide whether or not a bluff is in order.


What Actually Happened

Vadzim Kursevich raised to 500,000 on the button and Paul Guichard three-bet to 1,250,000 from the big blind.

Kursevich called and the flop fell JSpade Suit 7Heart Suit 5Diamond Suit. Guichard bet 625,000 and Kursevich made the call.

The turn was the 9Heart Suit and Guichard bet 1,325,000. Kursevich moved all in and Guichard immediately called with 5Heart Suit 5Spade Suit for a set. Kursevich showed 6Heart Suit 3Heart Suit for straight and flush draws.

According to the Card Player Poker Odds Calculator, Kursevich would win the pot only 29.55 percent of the time because some of his flush outs would now give Guichard a full house. In order to win the hand and the tournament, Kursevich needed any non-board pairing heart, eight or four.

The river was the 8Club Suit, giving him the EPT Deauville title and a first-place prize of €875,000.

What would you have done and why? Let us know in the comments section below. The best answer will win a Card Player prize pack.

pkrfce9

Bfillmaff wrote: »

quoted trig's articles to keep the format going:

So basically, FK U TRIGS!

Nice.

pkrfce9

I like these posts, guys. Thanks for feeding the POKER forum. Canadian tho...

Bfillmaff

Poker Strategy With John Vorhaus: Well, That Happens - Poker News

Well, That Happens

Vorhaus Explains How To Let Go Of Bad Outcomes

You’re dealt pocket kings and get all raisy-crazy preflop — as you should — only to face the dreaded ace on the flop. Well, that happens.

You flop middle set and get meatgrindered by set-over-set. Well, that happens.

Your A-2 in Omaha eight-or-better holding goes down in counterfeit flames when the river comes deuce to kill your low. Well, that happens.

Your nut straight dies an agonizing death at the hands of a runner-runner flush draw. Well, that happens.

Bad outcomes happen to everyone every day. The question is not, How can I avoid bad outcomes, for bad outcomes are inevitable. The question is, What do I do about it now? For years I have mostly just said, “Well, that happens,” and let those words be my mantra. When the words are working — when they’re feeding me the tranquility and perspective I need to stay off tilt — they’re worth their weight in gold — or chips, as the case may be.

Take those pocket kings. Sure, they’re a terrific hand — but no longer terrific when an ace hits the board and World War III breaks out in raises. If you’re holding those kings at that point, you’ve got two choices. You can curse the awful unfair unfairness of it all, pretend the ace is not an ace, and let your own pocket kings plunder your own stack, or you can say, “Well, that happens,” make the fold you know you have to make, and glide on into the next hand with a peaceful smile on your face.

Are you capable of saying, “Well, that happens?” By that, I mean can you really, genuinely, let go of bad outcomes? Many players think they can, but they can’t. They pay lip-service to the idea of tranquility, but they don’t really have it. When a foe draws thin against them and gets there, they know enough to say, “Nice hand, sir,” and keep their anger and resentment hidden. That’s good, but it’s not enough because there’s a world of difference — and it makes all the difference — between keeping your anger hidden and not having any anger to hide. When you can correctly bet the best hand into some yahoo who catches a three-outer to beat you, and genuinely feel no pain at that outcome, then you’re living in the fluffy pink world of “Well, that happens.”

Believe me, it’s where you want to be.

People get so bent out of shape when they lose. They get caught up in a negative-feedback loop of:

Bad outcomes, generating
Bad outlook, begetting
Bad play, and leading to more, yes,
Bad outcomes.

They put themselves on tilt by not being able to take setbacks in stride. We love playing against these people because we know that they are our secret allies in the conspiracy of their own destruction. But it’s vital that we not let ourselves get similarly bent out of shape. It’s crucial that we just stay cool. “Well, that happens” helps with that. “Well, that happens” trains us to push past the past.

So how do you acquire this mindset? How do you manifest not just the appearance of tranquility but the fact of it? First, acknowledge that the anger is there and it’s real. Acknowledge that you hate the bad beat, and resent the suck-out artist, and revile the dangblasted dealer who seems to give everyone the cards they need but you. Don’t pretend these feelings don’t exist; they exist in all of us, save the Buddha (and even Buddha had his bad days). Accept that your play is colored by emotions. This is the first step toward neutralizing the toxic effect those emotions can have.

Next, practice an alternate strategy. For me this means writing the words, “Well, that happens” on a note card and placing it behind my stack of chips. Every time I look down, there it is, reminding me that the road to perfect poker, at least in an attitudinal sense, is really only three words long. I like to say it out loud. No matter how big the pot nor how bad the beat, I require of myself to say only and exactly, “Well, that happens.” It’s my shortcut to stability, and it’s yours to use, free of charge.

The “Well, that happens” way is a slow change, but it can happen. Let your attitude shift by slow degrees. Know that your temper and your righteous indignation won’t magically vanish overnight. But keep at it. Keep saying and thinking and trying to believe, “Well, that happens,” until eventually the phrase, and the attendant emotional state, become second nature to you. Somewhere along that line you’ll leave your angry old self behind and became a person who no longer struggles to take bad beats in stride.

Eventually you won’t even see them as bad beats. You’ll begin to see them as exciting opportunities to practice your well, that happens mindset. This is perverse, I know: rooting for bad beats just so you can prove to yourself that bad beats beat on you no more. But you know what? It helped me and it’ll help you. Try it and see.

Then again, maybe “Well, that happens” aren’t words that resonate on your frequency. Okay, fine: What strategy can you cook up to defeat the enemy of your own emotion? It may be some different useful reminder written on a note card, or some cold water on your face, or a timely phone call to a friend. Whatever your strategy is, I encourage you to take the time to think one up because poker only seems to be about cards and odds and bets and pots. It’s really about head and heart and fortitude and spirit. Above all, it’s about tranquility. Dial that in, and everything else pretty much takes care of itself. ♠

trigs

Consider Postflop Equity When Selecting Preflop Hands | PokerNews

Ask a group of poker players for their opinion on which street is the easiest to play and I would be willing to bet good money that almost all of them will answer preflop.

Generally speaking, preflop decisions are the easiest to make in no-limit hold’em, and not only for the fact there are no community cards to consider. Before the flop, all you need to think about is your hole cards, the action before you, and the players waiting to act after you. You don’t have to worry about flush draws, straight draws, or if anyone has a set. It’s just you, your hand, and the remaining opponents still with cards.
One of the problems of the situation being relatively “simple” creates, however, is that players tend not to give preflop decisions their full attention. Instead, they play a robotic style where “Hand X” is always a raise from “Position Y” because that’s what they have always done in the past and have seen others do, too.

Raising first-in from the cutoff or button is an area where people know they should be aggressive and be playing a much wider range of hands than they would elsewhere at the table. But often players are too loose with their starting hand requirements from these two late positions and then subsequently find themselves falling foul of that looseness after the flop.

If poker were played in a vacuum, it would be profitable to play 100% of your hands from the button, but poker isn’t played in a vacuum. While some players are happy to raise with a hand such as from the button because they think their hand is stronger than what the blinds are likely holding, they will instantly muck a hand such as because they think (correctly) that is a terrible hand postflop. But isn’t too far behind in the postflop rubbish scale, either.

Imagine we have on the button and we open for a raise because the blinds are likely to have hands with which they dislike calling raises out of position. Then that plan is ruined by the big blind’s call. The flop falls , the big blind checks, we make a continuation bet, and the big blind calls again. The turn is the and the big blind checks once more. Now what do we do?

If we check behind, then we will probably get to showdown with a weak hand and potentially lose the pot. We could bet, but the doesn’t look like a scary card, so we’re likely to be called again and have wasted more chips than we should have.

The fact is, neither option seems a good one. But the scenario could have been avoided by putting more thought into our preflop hand range and selecting a holding that would end up with better postflop equity.
Examples of hands that have good postflop equity include

• suited cards, particularly suited aces with which we can flop the nut flush or the nut flush draw and keep up our aggression;
• connected cards that can stay aggressive when they have a solid draw; and
• high cards that miss more flops than they hit, but having six outs to your overcards can often be enough to continue betting.

Think of how many combinations of suited cards, high cards, and connected cards there are and you will soon see that you can still be opening a lot of hands from the button — hands that have a good chance of having plenty of postflop equity once the first community cards come into view.

Preflop play might be relatively “simple” in some respects, but that shouldn’t encourage you not to be mindful of what lies ahead after the flop when making that initial action.

Bfillmaff

really like this one, it's similar to the first one in that Ed walks you through his thought process during an individual hand to show an idea:

[HOTW] Attacking A Capped Range

Attacking A Capped Range

It's a daytime $2-$5 game in Las Vegas. In general, Vegas games play conservatively with few players willing to stack off. Daytime games play even more so. In this particular game, there were two players throwing their (relatively small) stacks around. Everyone else seemed willing to just sit back and try to catch a hand.

Everyone folded to a regular two off the button who opened for $20. He seemed to be playing cautiously, though he'd 3-bet twice in an hour and a half, which suggests that he might be a little willing to gamble. I didn't see him open-limp with any hands, so his range to open here is fairly wide. We're playing $800 stacks.

I was in the small blind with 7♣7♦. I called.

I might consider a 3-bet here under some circumstances. But in this case, one of the wild players stacking off right and left was in the big blind, and I definitely wanted to give him a chance to enter the pot while I held a pocket pair.

The big blind folded, however.

The flop came Q♣T♣9♦.

This is obviously a terrible flop for my hand. My opponent should bet the lion's share of his range on this flop (because it's a particularly good flop for a preflop raiser in position). If he had bet, I would have folded.

But he checked. This was almost certainly an error on his part, but it's one I see very commonly in the $2-$5 game.

His checking range almost has to be weak. Would he check a set? Of course not. Two pair? Probably not. He might check a flopped straight, but he'd have to have K-J (possible) or J-8 (unlikely) for that. Would he check A-A or K-K? It might be a reasonable play, but most $2-$5 players wouldn't. Most wouldn't check A-Q or K-Q or Q-J either.

On the other hand, many $2-$5 players will go ahead and check back their bricked hands like A-5 and 3-3 on this flop. I can expect my opponent to bet most (but perhaps not all) of his strong hands on a flop like this one, and I can expect him to check back his air perhaps more than he should. This all adds up to a player who is primed to fold if I bet the turn and river.

The turn was the 5♥.

I bet pot, $40. My opponent called. That he called means he didn't brick the flop. He probably holds a weak hand with a king or jack in it such as A-K, K-T, J-9, and the like.

If the river comes a low club or bricks entirely (including pairing one of the flop cards), I plan to make a big bluff. I'd bet at least pot, which is $120. I might even try to seal the deal by overbetting to $150 or $180. Overbetting doesn't increase my break-even fold percentage by too much. For example, if I bet pot, I need a fold 50% of the time to break even. If I bet pot-and-a-half, I need a fold only 60% of the time to break even. It's reasonable to think that the move from $120 to $180 could get my opponent off some of his marginal pair-plus-draw hands like Q-J or K-T often enough to increase my fold percentage to justify the bigger bluff.

Either way, however, I'm bluffing a brick or low flush card. Even though my opponent hit the board (he called the turn), he checked back the flop. He was worried that I might have flopped a big hand and that I would check-raise him. Since I know he's worried about that, and I know he (quite likely by this point) doesn't have a big hand, I'm going to try to scare him away.

The river was the J♦, putting a four-straight on board. I abandoned ship. Now he's likely got either two pair or a straight. I'm not going to try to bluff through that range.

I checked. He checked and showed A-J. Ugh. It was one of the only hands he likely still would have auto-folded to a bluff. But that's the way it goes. I don't think a bluff was profitable, because he had too many other hands like A-K, K-T, J-T, and so on in his range.

Normally I don't like running bluffs after the flop when I have little-to-no equity when called. I follow the rule "no set, no bet" more often than not. But when players mark themselves with weakness, as I believe my opponent did here when he checked back the flop, I usually go for it.

Bfillmaff

Jacked from a 2+2 thread:

"Outplaying" players who don't fold

Many new players believe outplaying your opponents means making them fold.

This is wrong!

This is worse than wrong.

This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the game.

The goal in poker is to take the other player's money.

You outplay your opponents by taking their money.

Period.

Full stop.

Nothing more. Nothing less.

It does not matter how you take their money!

When you die and try to get into to heaven, St. Peter isn't going to be there tallying up all your sick bluffs before letting you in.

Nobody cares but you.

Yes, when you are playing against tight players a common way to take their money is to make them fold a better hand. However, this is a much more difficult strategy to use against loose players.

There any many more ways to outplay your opponents.

You outplay your opponents when you iso raise weak players.

You outplay your opponents when you set mine against tight raisers who can't fold overpairs.

You outplay your opponents when you make smart, thin value bets against calling stations.

You outplay your opponents when you don't pay them off because they obviously have you beat.

You outplay your opponents when you make them chase with bad odds.

You outplay your opponents when you call because they've given you good odds to chase.

etc.

etc.

etc.

Equating outplaying to making players fold is like saying basketball is all about free-throws.

That makes Shaq one of the worst players of all time, not one of the best.

trigs

Seven Attention Targets for Beginning Poker Players | PokerNews

Most beginners at poker know they should pay attention. They understand that poker is a game of information and that they should gather as much of it as possible. To recognize this is an accomplishment; to cultivate the discipline actually to do it is even better.

Simply resolving to pay attention, however, isn’t enough. Indeed, that might not even be possible. You need to be paying attention to something.

If you give yourself the order to pay attention, and don’t give yourself more specific orders, you’ll probably spend most of your time looking at who is betting and calling, and perhaps how they are doing the betting and calling. Again, that’s pretty good, but the information you get that way is a long way from being as useful as it could be. You probably won’t file away important information about the context and relevance of those bets and calls.

You want actionable, relevant information that will help you make the best decisions and win the money. When you search through your memory (or a computer file of notes) for help with a close decision, you want what you have stored to be the sort of stuff that clarifies your decisions — information that prevents mistakes and turns marginal spots into money makers.

If you’ve been trying to pay attention without a good plan for what to pay attention to, however, you’re likely not to find such stuff. Rather, you’re liable to find a confused heap of indistinct, half-relevant memories.

What Should We Be Paying Attention To?
When Andrew Brokos and I sort through e-mails for the Thinking Poker podcast, we are often impressed by how hard our correspondents are working to gather information. But just as often we worry that the information they have isn’t as relevant as it ought to be. Usually we wind up recommending that they improve their information, not only by learning poker generally but also by paying attention to different and more specific things.

I’m going to give some suggestions for good “attention targets” for beginning players, although I think most of them are appropriate for everyone — indeed, I try to have these in mind every time I sit down to play.

First, though, I want to note that the process of refining and improving what you pay attention to is valuable far beyond the poker table. Serious, honest assessment of your information-gathering and -storage faculties will improve every part of your life. Poker led me to a somewhat disappointing, but ultimately fruitful, assessment of my own ability to pay attention properly and of the relevance of what I chose to pay attention to. Even if I’d never graduated from micro-stakes, this assessment would have made my choice to learn poker worthwhile.

Eventually you will learn a broad set of questions to ask, answer, and remember about the games in which you play. What I am suggesting here are a few with which you might start. Each of these questions points to something specific to pay attention to — for example, having the questions listed below under #2 in mind ought to focus your attention on raise sizes during hands that are folded to the button.

About preflop position:

Did the player on the button have a chance to play for a limp or only a small raise? If so, what did he choose? If he showed down his cards, did it look like he was playing something weak just because he had position?

Has the player on my right ever folded when the action folded around to her on the button? Has she ever limped in that situation? What cards did she have when she limped? Has she used one raise size or many in that situation?

Did an early-position raiser act quickly or slowly? Did he seem hesitant about playing his hand, as if he liked the hand but then started to worry about his position? (That happens pretty often.) After he raised, did he track the action closely as it proceeded around the table? (That can indicate many things, including intense interest about whether he’s going to get action with a premium hand.)

Some other important preflop information:

Who has cold-called a three-bet (that is, a reraise after an initial preflop raise), and with what cards? If the player who did showed down his hand, was he slow playing a big hand? Did he have a good-but-not-great hand that he didn’t want to fold but didn’t feel comfortable raising? Or was he simply making a loose call?

After the flop:

Which players have raised before the flop and failed to make a continuation bet when heads-up with the initiative?

Who bet the flop the last time there were at least four players in the pot? Did she have the initiative? How big was the bet relative to the pot? (Many players have many different bet sizes in this situation, so that you can often judge their hand very accurately by their sizing.)

Who has bet the river in a pot that contained at least 50 big blinds? Who, if anyone, was value-betting with less than two pair?

Answering some or all of these questions as you play will provide you with valuable information about the tendencies and playing styles of your opponents. Note also how by answering each question you are doing more than simply observing passively, but you’re gathering specific ideas about how your opponents play — ideas you can act on in future hands.

So pay attention at the tables, but try to do more than simply follow the action as it circles around you. Try to focus your attention on specific actions and patterns exhibited by your opponents in telling situations such as those described here.

Bfillmaff

In todays lesson, Miss Finland shows how to play A2o in position.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCO0c7fJ1pQ

compuease

Mario can play A,2 in ANY position, and DOES.

UBetIFold

^^ Nate Meyvis and Andrew Brokos make a really top notch podcast. Highly recommended.

trigs

UBetIFold wrote: »

^^ Nate Meyvis and Andrew Brokos make a really top notch podcast. Highly recommended.

+1. i think brokos is one of the best at analyzing and explaining the thought process in poker.

here's another article from him. nothing complicated, but still a good read.

Thinking Poker: One of Those Nights | PokerNews

Last night was one of those nights. It felt like nothing was going right. My complaints will surely sound familiar, but hang in there, because this isn’t just a bad beat story. There’s a lesson at the end.

For one thing, I was at the table for nearly five hours, and in that time I was dealt exactly one premium hand.

Of course it takes more than good starting hands to win at no-limit hold ’em, and it’s entirely possible to win without them. Sometimes your opponents are willing to play all loose and weak and fit-or-fold, and if they are, you can show a nice profit by raising preflop with anything halfway decent and then scooping up all that preflop money with a continuation bet. This is a nice little low-risk strategy when it works.

No one was folding to me, though. It seemed like every time I raised, I got called in at least three spots, and my continuation bets never picked up the pot. Often, I didn’t even get the opportunity to double barrel or turn a pair because my continuation bets got not just called but raised.

A serious poker player should have more than one strategy in his bag of tricks. You can’t rely on your opponents playing the way you want them to. You have to adapt to them, figure out where their leaks are, then craft your own play to take advantage of those leaks. If my opponents were going to treat a $60 raise the same as a $10 call, then I’d make sure I had the best hand when I put in that $60 raise, and I wouldn’t bother betting the flop unless I connected with it.

As I said, there weren’t many premiums coming my way, but I got plenty of hands of the {A-}{J-} and {K-}{Q-} variety. Most of them missed the flop, but even when they didn’t, I generally ended up folding. I twice released top pair before the river, and twice bet-folded middle pair on the flop.

It was frustrating. At times I felt like I was getting pushed around. Maybe I was. I didn’t generally see the hands I was folding to, so they could have been bluffs. I did once call a pot-sized river bet from one of my more aggressive opponents in a spot where I thought he could easily be bluffing and his value range would consist only of hands that improved on the innocuous river. He showed me a rivered two pair. Like I said, it was one of those nights.

Here’s the thing: at the end of the session, I was up nearly 150 big blinds, giving me a wildly unsustainable win-rate of roughly 100 big blinds per 100 hands played. (For comparison, anything in the double digits is a very good win-rate online, where games are admittedly a bit tougher.) The vast majority of my winnings came from just two of those 150 hands, and I honestly don’t think I won more than 10 pots all night.

Losing pots is no fun, especially when it feels like you’re getting bluffed. Ultimately, though, the number of pots you win or lose is far less important than the size of the pots you win and lose. Sometimes keeping your losses small means letting your opponents win the large majority of the pots, maybe even letting them bluff you repeatedly.

If your opponents seem to be constantly calling and raising you, one of three things is going on:

They are getting hit with the deck. There are going to be nights when everyone else gets good cards and you don’t. There is generally nothing you can do to force a win in these situations, so your best option is to cut your losses. (See my earlier “How to Earn Money With the Worst Hands in Poker” for more on that topic.)
They are playing recklessly. This might mean suicidal bluffing, or overplaying medium-strength hands, or some combination of the two.
It’s all in your head. Remember, there are eight of them and one of you. Of course “they” are going to get more strong hands. You can’t reasonably compare your own share of good luck to the combined good fortunes of eight other seats at the table.
That last point may seem obvious, but in my experience it’s by far the most common of the three. On the Thinking Poker podcast, on my blog, and with the students I coach, I am constantly reassuring people that their opponents aren’t playing back at them as much as they think.

Your inclination is usually to remember your own bad luck much better than you remember anyone else’s and to believe that you “deserve” to win a pot every 10 minutes or so. Poker is frustrating, and live poker is slow, and sometimes there will be long stretches where you win little or nothing. This doesn’t mean that you are doing anything wrong. In fact the biggest mistake you can make in these situations is to assume that you need to start trying to make something happen.

This is why it’s important to have a strong baseline game. It’s not that I’m unwilling or unable to call down light or rebluff, it’s just that I know which hands are good for that purpose and which are not. I don’t often make these decisions based only on a hunch that someone might be messing with me. When I get raised on the flop and suspect that my opponent has a weak hand, I usually just fold and make a mental note.

If you can determine with certainty that one or more of your opponents is playing recklessly, then you certainly can improve your results by rebluffing with a high frequency or calling down extra light. The problem is that if your perception is wrong — if it really is just in your head or if your opponents are getting uncommonly many strong hands — then this change in strategy can lead to huge losses.

It’s also important to remember that you don’t have to make any changes to your baseline game to benefit from reckless opponents. Remember when I said I only got one premium hand all night? I had {K-}{K-}, and my raise to $120 from the small blind was called by four players. Because I’d been doing so much checking and giving up after missing flops in multiway pots, I checked the {J-}{10-}{x-} flop, and sure enough one of my opponents shoved $800 into the $600 pot with middle pair.

That one win more than made up for all of the small and medium pots I lost along the way. And made it a lot easier to endure another “one of those nights.”

Bfillmaff

Another hand of the week

A Delayed Continuation Bet


The delayed continuation bet is a play you can use at all levels of poker, but it's particularly useful in relatively passive games like you often find at $1-$2 and $2-$5.

You raise preflop and everyone checks to you on the flop. Instead of continuation betting, you check it back. Then on the turn if everyone checks again, you bet.

Here's an example I played recently. It's a $2-$5 game in Las Vegas. It's chock full of regulars, who tend to be tight postflop and somewhat passive.

I was in the cutoff with A♣J♣. Two players limped, and I made it $25. The blinds folded, and the limpers both called. There's $82 in the pot with about $500 behind.

The flop came K♦6♠4♥.

My opponents checked. I can bet here and "rep the king." (I put it in quotes because I think it's a common, but flawed, way to think about this bet.) But if either of my opponents has a king, they'll call, and I have few outs. I'll either have to try to bully them off the king later in the hand, or I'll just have to give up.

It's not a bad play to bet, because I can bet half pot and expect to get two folds more than one-third of the time. So it does show a profit.

But this is a static board--one that's unlikely to change in nature significantly between the flop and river. On static boards, position is less important, and giving free cards is less costly. Therefore, this is a type of flop that I wouldn't mind checking sometimes even if I held a king.

For instance, if I held K-T, I might check it back.With a marginal kicker like a ten, it would be too ambitious to go for three streets of value against these players. I can give a free card, hope someone catches second pair on the turn with a card like a jack or nine, and maybe get a little bit of value.

I can do the same thing with A-J. Except in this case, I'm checking back primarily to see if either of my somewhat passive opponents wants to bet the turn. If they bet--at least half-pot or more--I'll give them credit for the king and fold. If they check it again to me, I'll assume that the coast is clear, and I'll bet and expect to take it down.

If someone checks-and-calls my turn bet, I might consider trying to blow them out of the water on the river with a big bet. In my experience big river bets rarely get called when the action begins so slowly like this.

So when my opponents checked to me on the flop, I checked it back to go for the delayed continuation bet.

The turn was the 3♥. My opponents both checked again, I bet $40 into $82, and they both folded.

Bfillmaff

Posted today on Cardplayer

Poker Strategy: 5 Situations Where You Fold Too Much

I generate much of my edge in live no-limit hold’em games by getting people to fold in situations they shouldn’t fold. Sure, a lot of it also comes in those uncommon pots where all the money goes in, I have a set, and my opponent turns over some head-scratcher, no-hope hand. But certainly the most consistent edge comes from banging away until people fold.

If you’re like most of my opponents, you fold too often in some specific situations. Here are five of them that arise commonly:

Situation 1. Ace-high and overcard hands on rag boards.

You have A-J or K-Q on a board like 6-6-2 rainbow. When the board comes rags, relatively few hands hit it. This means that unpaired big card hands are still among the better hands available. For example, say someone plays roughly the best 20% of hands preflop. On a 6-6-2 rainbow flop, this player will have a pair or better (i.e., a six, a deuce, or a pocket pair) only 28% of the time. This means that a hand like A-J is still much better than the average hand.

Not only does A-J still preserve a lot of value on a rag board just for its showdown value, the hands it’s most likely to be behind are hands like 5-5 or 9-9. A-J has six live outs against these pocket pairs. Furthermore, a player with a pocket pair has to be concerned about overcards that hit. So if a king or queen hits the turn, for instance, the player with A-J can often turn the hand profitably into a bluff.

When the board comes rags, don’t be quick to fold, especially holding a big card hand. You can call on the flop and even sometimes on the turn as well.

Situation 2. Monochrome boards.

When the flop comes all one suit, many players mentally check out on the hand if they don’t hold a flush or a strong flush draw. But this reaction overestimates the chance that another player has flopped a flush.

Using that 20% preflop range from the previous example, on a flop like Kd 6d 3d, a player flops a flush only about five percent of the time. They hold the nut flush draw only another six percent of the time. They hold any diamond at all only about 37% of the time.

That means that about 63% of the time, a player who plays a typical preflop range will have no flush and no draw on a monochrome flop. Some of these hands are top pair, but you can usually get players off top pair on these flops if you keep betting.

“But Ed,” you say, “My opponents don’t play 20% of hands. They play any two suited cards. These flops are exactly what they’re looking for.”

Not so fast. If I adjust the range to a roughly 60% range that includes any two suited cards (and also a number of questionable unsuited hands as well, since loose players play loose), the flush percentage increases from 5% to 6.25%. That’s it. The flush draw numbers don’t change a lot either.

The bottom line is that when a flop comes monochrome, any given player is a favorite to have no flush and no draw. If you see such a flop two- or three-handed, it can be a good opportunity to rep the flush and stick around until everyone else folds.

Situation 3. An over card hits the board on the turn.

Players who have flopped a pair fold too much when an overcard comes on the turn. Say I raise preflop, and you call with J-10 suited. The flop comes 10-7-5. You check and call. A king hits the turn. You check, and I bet.

Many players seem to assume that, since I raised preflop, I probably have either a pocket pair or overcards like A-K or K-Q. When a king hits and I bet, they figure that one way or another, their J-10 is beat.

The problem is that I can have plenty of hands besides overpairs and overcards. I can have hands like A-5 suited or 7-6 suited. I can have hands like 6-6. I can also have unpaired big card hands like A-Q and A-J.

Many players stick it out for one more street with a good kicker, such as A-10, but players fold so often after an overcard hits the turn that, in this situation, I tend to bet all my hands that can’t beat top pair.

Situation 4. Drawing hands on the turn.

Most regular players have learned that it’s not right to “chase” draws on the turn. With only one card to come, typical draws like flush and straight draws are nearly 4-to-1 underdogs to come in. In no-limit, you’re often facing at least a half-pot bet, which offers only 3-to-1 odds. Getting 3-to-1 on a 4-to-1 proposition is not good.

But that doesn’t mean you should simply fold all these drawing hands. There are two reasons. First, you can sometimes make money on the river after the draw hits. This concept of implied odds is fairly well understood. Except in a typical $2-$5 game, many players will go out of their way to avoid paying you off if you get there on the river. Often implied odds can’t justify a call either.

But when people go out of their way to fold the river, you have a potential bluffing opportunity. This is why it’s not right to fold all your draws on the turn. If you miss, your hand still has value as a bluff. Typical regular players don’t carry enough draws to the river, and they don’t bluff often enough on the river either. They’d be more dangerous if they drew more often and then sometimes fired the river when they missed.

Situation 5. Against small bets.

Typical small stakes regulars simply give too much credit to small bets. This is somewhat true on the flop, but it becomes very true on the turn and river. It’s way too easy to bet one-third or one-quarter pot on the turn and river and get a fold. In many hands, I can bet $150 on the river into a $500-plus pot and still be fairly sure I will get a fold. That just ain’t right.

Final Thoughts

It’s possible (indeed likely in some circumstances) that many of these folds are not, strictly speaking, wrong in your games. That’s because your opponents aren’t bluffing properly in these situations. So when they do bet, you can fairly expect A-J to be no good on a 7-3-2 board. You can expect Q-9 to be no good on a 9-5-4-J board. You can expect they have the near-nuts when they bet the river, no matter how small they bet.

But if you are folding in these situations and folding correctly, likely your regular opponents fold in these situations as well. This makes them prime bluffing opportunities. Next time you play, be on the lookout and see if you can sneak in an extra bluff. ♠

trigs

Lessons from the 2014 PCA: The Importance of Position | PokerNews

A year ago Fabian Quoss kicked off his year in triumphant fashion by winning the 2014 PCA $100,000 Super High Roller, besting a 46-entry field including Dan Shak heads-up to win the trophy and a $1,629,940 first prize. Those two battled numerous times over the course of the final table, with a hand involving the pair with four players left well illustrating how important position can be in no-limit hold’em.

Preflop
With the blinds at 40,000/80,000, Shak opened for a standard raise of of 175,000 — just over 2x the big blind — holding {5-Spades}{5-Clubs}. Just as standard was the defend out of the big blind by Quoss with {9-Clubs}{8-Clubs}.

There’s not much to analyze here as both plays are well within accepted norms. Quoss wanted to see a flop with this hand so three-betting doesn’t make much sense as it would open up the door for Shak to four-bet which would force a fold from Quoss.

The Flop
The flop came {3-Clubs}{Q-Spades}{10-Clubs} and after Quoss checked Shak bet 225,000. Quoss called.

While both Shak and Quoss’s plays here are fine, you could make an argument for several different ways of playing the hand, especially by Quoss.

On Quoss’s end, he could have played the hand much stronger and most likely taken the pot down by doing so. Leading out with a bet probably would not accomplish that as Shak would use his position to call and then evaluate the strength of his opponent’s hand on the turn, thereby putting Quoss in a tough position. However, a check-raise would tell Shak the story that Quoss had connected with the flop. With Shak only having a pair of fives, he would have a difficult time continuing after a check-raise because he would know he’s most likely going to face a large turn bet as well.

Shak uses his position well here by betting. Quoss has shown weakness by just calling preflop and checking the flop. Shak bets just over half the pot — nothing wrong with that amount. The only other play you could make an argument for here would be to check behind, but given Quoss’s play in the hand thus far, betting is the better option.

The Turn
The turn brought the {10-Spades} and this time Quoss led out with a bet of 500,000 into the almost 900,000-chip pot. Shak tanked for a bit before making the call.

The problem with Quoss’s play here is that the line he took didn’t necessarily add up. If he had a {Q-} or {10-}, he would have either bet or check-raised the flop the majority of the time. Meanwhile if he had a monster like two pair, trips, or a full house, he would most likely continue to defer to the aggressive Shak and let him make a bet that he could either check-raise or call to try to get more value on the river. Leading out, however, seems like an attempt to take down the pot.

Here is where position becomes so important. If Shak were first to act, check-calling a 500,000 bet on the turn with just a pair of fives would be very difficult because he would know he’d have to be first to act on the river and would have to check the majority of the time and react to a Quoss bet. By being in position, however, Shak gets to see how Quoss reacts to his call and can then make a river decision accordingly. Calling is a play you can make in position and one that is generally a mistake out of position.

The River
The river was the {A-Spades}, both players checked, and Shak took down the pot.

The only way Quoss could have won the pot on fifth street would have been to bet, but he elected to check. With 1.9 million in the middle and about 2.5 million behind for Quoss, checking was definitely the safest alternative. However, you could also argue that he needed to follow through with the aggressive line he took on the turn.

A bet of 800,000 would apply enough pressure to make it hard for Shak to call unless he was certain Quoss was bluffing. The difference between 1.7 million (which is what Quoss would have if he bet 800,000 and lost the hand) and 2.5 million (which is what keeps by checking) is marginal. However, the difference between 2.5 million and 4.4 million (which is what Quoss would have by winning the pot) is substantial.

Shak’s check behind was an easy decision here. If he were to bet he would usually get called by hands that beat him, plus betting would open up the door to a check-raise that he wouldn’t be able to call.

Conclusion
As illustrated above, there are many ways to play a poker hand. Position affords you the ability to process more information and make better decisions than when you are out of position. It also helps you control the pot size in many situations.

When playing poker, always try be mindful of your position and factor that into your decision as to whether to play the hand or not. If you are going to be out of position with a marginal hand, it’s usually better to err on the side of caution and fold hands you might play in other positions. When in position, however, you can widen your range because of the informational advantage you’ll have throughout the hand.

trigs

Lessons from the 2014 PCA: Playing Premium Hands | PokerNews

Last year Dominik Panka topped a field of 1,031 players including a very tough final table to win the 2014 PCA Main Event and a $1,423,096 first prize. During seven-handed play at that final table a key hand arose involving eventual runner-up Mike “Timex” McDonald and then-chip leader Madis Muur, one of the most important pots of the tournament. The hand didn’t go to showdown — in fact, there wasn’t even a flop — but it still demonstrated several good lessons regarding playing premium hands.

The hand began with McDonald second in chips to Muur. As it happened, both players were dealt premium hands — McDonald picking up {A-Clubs}{K-Spades} on the button and Muur {Q-Spades}{Q-Diamonds} in the small blind — which set the stage for a possible huge pot between the pair.

With the blinds at 30,000/60,000 with a 5,000 ante, it folded to McDonald who raised to 125,000 on the button. Muur three-bet to 310,000 out of the small blind, McDonald four-bet to 700,000, Muur five-bet to 1.275 million, then McDonald moved all in for 6.73 million and Muur folded.

McDonald had started the hand with 6.77 million chips, and ended it with 8.135 million and the chip lead. Muur fell from 7.315 million to 6.035 million.

There are several things that we can take away from this hand, starting with the button vs. small blind dynamic.

1. Button vs. Small Blind
When the action folds to McDonald on the button, the final table momentarily becomes a three-handed poker game between him, Muur in the small blind, and Daniel Gamez in the big blind. Gamez had taken some unconventional lines up to this point, but in general he wasn’t getting out of line too often.

McDonald’s opening range on the button is extremely wide, because he has position on the chip leader, Muur, in the small blind, and Gamez is either folding preflop or check-folding on a majority of dry boards from the big blind. That means when McDonald opens with his raise, Muur doesn’t necessarily want him just to fold to a three-bet, because he is absolutely crushing McDonald’s range.

When McDonald responds to Muur’s reraise by four-betting to 700,000, his range shrinks. Now it appears that the Canadian is “polarized” — he either has a really good hand (the positive pole) or a really bad hand (the negative pole) — because McDonald would want to take a flop in position with middling hands like {q-Diamonds}{j-Diamonds} or {8-Spades}{8-Clubs}. When you four-bet with hands like that, you put yourself at risk of a five-bet and you lose out on opportunities to capitalize on the implied odds of flopping a set or straight/flush draws. McDonald knows this, and so his four-bet suggests he either has a very strong hand or is bluffing with very little.

Meanwhile Muur is in a tough spot facing the four-bet. It’s hard to get any value from a five-bet because McDonald will likely fold his four-bet bluffs and either call or six-bet with his premium hands. McDonald is capable of six-bet bluffing, but, again, you receive very little value from a seven-bet. If you plan to play the pot out of position, it would be wise to try and avoid a bloated pot and just call the four-bet.

The Estonian isn’t interested in playing a pot out of position against arguably the toughest player at the table, however, so he puts in a five-bet.

2. Aggression and Blockers
When Muur five-bets, the complexity of the hand goes up yet another level. How often in Muur bluffing? How often does McDonald win against bluffs/premiums when he peels? If McDonald puts in a six-bet, is it for value or is it a bluff?

McDonald doesn’t know what Muur is holding, but having an ace and a king in his own hand makes it less likely that his opponent has pocket kings or pocket aces. The Canadian holds two “blockers.”

While the concept of “blockers” is more prevalent in Omaha because there are more cards and tend to be more draws, it can certainly apply to no-limit hold’em. For example, if you and an opponent are heads-up on a board of {2-Spades}{5-Hearts}{10-Hearts}{k-Spades}{7-Hearts}, and you hold the {a-Hearts}, you know that your opponent can’t have the nuts. If he or she is a very tight player, you might even be able to bluff your opponent off of a flush if you know the player is unwilling to call a big bet without the {a-Hearts}.

McDonald knows that there are only three aces and three kings remaining in the deck, and thus can use this information to analyze Muur’s range.

McDonald’s shove is incredibly aggressive, and puts Muur in another tough spot. If he calls the shove, he would be risking about 92% of his chips. The best-case scenario for Muur would be McDonald is blowing up with some random hand. Otherwise, Muur is flipping for nearly half of the chips in play with seven players still remaining (if McDonald has ace-king), or he is way behind if McDonald happens to have kings or aces.

There is no pressure like the pressure of potentially playing a 225-big blind pot with hundreds of thousands of dollars in equity on the line.

3. Having a Plan
When Muur puts in a five-bet, he has to be prepared for McDonald to move all in. There needs to be a plan. Judging by his reaction, Muur wasn’t ready and had no idea what to do once McDonald went for the kill.

Isaac Haxton was a guest commentator on EPT Live during this hand, and he disliked the five-bet/fold line from Muur. He explained that Muur basically turned pocket queens — the third best pair in hold’em — into a bluff. Basically, once Muur put in a five-bet, he was committed to his hand and should have called the all in. Continuing to bloat the pot and then fold was a mistake.

Luckily for Muur, he was still second in chips after the hand and managed to finish in fourth place, earning $581,040. Usually mistakes like these limit players from making deep runs, particularly in your average, shallow-stacked tournament.

trigs

Talking Poker: Implied Odds | PokerNews

Each week, the Talking Poker series will highlight a particular poker term. We’ll give you a clear, to-the-point definition of the term and an example of the strategic concept to which it refers, so that you can start using the term and implementing the related strategy into your game. This week we’re focusing on implied odds.

Definition

Implied odds are the odds you are getting after the assumed result of betting for the remainder of the hand.

Example

It’s a $1/$2 no-limit hold’em cash game. Player A limps in early position and Player B raises to $10 with {3-}{3-} in late position. Action folds back around to Player A who reraises to $25 with $300 behind (Player B has him covered). Player A is a very tight, predictable player who would most likely only limp-reraise a big pair, which means if Player B remains in the hand he will want to hit a set to beat his opponent’s better starting hand.

The odds of hitting a set on the flop are about 7-to-1. Meanwhile, the current pot odds Player B is getting are about 2.5-to-1. Pot odds are calculated by comparing the size of the pot to the amount needed to call. In this case, the pot is currently $38 ($3 for the blinds + Player B’s $10 raise + Player A’s $25 reraise) and Player B has to call $15 to stay in the hand. Since $38 ÷ $15 = 2.53 or about 2.5, that makes the current pot odds about 2.5-to-1.

Implied odds further consider possible future action in a hand. In this case, Player B will want to factor in how much he might win should a {3-} come to give him a set and the better hand. To calculate how much he’ll need to make in future streets of this hand to have the right implied odds, Player B subtracts the current pot odds from his draw odds, then multiplies that figure by the amount needed to call.

7-to-1 (draw odds) - 2.5-to-1 (Pot odds) = 4.5-to-1, and 4.5 x $15 = $67.50.

Considering the implied odds, Player B needs to believe that he will make $67.50 or more on average (on top of what is already in the middle) if he calls the reraise and then hits a set versus Player A. Since Player A has $300 behind (and Player B has Player A covered), Player B does believe if he hits his set that he will win at least $67.50 more in the hand. Therefore Player B is getting the correct implied odds to call this reraise.

Strategic Considerations

Implied odds are an extension of pot odds. If you aren’t getting the correct pot odds on the flop to draw to your straight (or flush or set), you should calculate implied odds to see if you are getting the right price. Be careful not to overestimate how often you will get more money from your opponent just because you want to validate a call.

djgolfcan

Can someone please delete the strat article on "situations you fold too much".

That is all.

trigs

djgolfcan wrote: »

Can someone please delete the strat article on "situations you fold too much".

That is all.

yeah, i read that one before it was posted here and i thought it was kind of a strange article. i think i get what he's going for, but considering this is an article that is directed at newb players or weak players, i find it very dangerous to be teaching them that they should not be folding in these situations. obviously, he never says anything like "do this all the time" or "never fold here", but still i thought it could lead to some poor play from weak players.

Bfillmaff

^ I disagree, Ed's posts are rarely directed at new players - that one just happened to be on Cardplayer.

Those of you who play with me know I never fold anyway, so no issue here!

Bfillmaff

Also, dj just wants it down since he pretty much has air 100% of the time

djgolfcan

Exactly. I bet out on every one of the situations descibed in the article as MOST people fold on those boards if they have not connected.

Gonna need to learn some new moves, I guess.

trigs

Bfillmaff wrote: »

^ I disagree, Ed's posts are rarely directed at new players - that one just happened to be on Cardplayer.

Those of you who play with me know I never fold anyway, so no issue here!

i generally like ed's posts. idk, i just had a strange feeling about this one.

trigs

Cash Catastrophes: Missing Value with the Nuts | PokerNews

The Hand
It’s my regular $1/$2 no-limit hold’em game. The effective stacks are about $400. The player sitting under the gun (UTG) raises to $7. I call in the cutoff (CO) with {7-Spades}{7-Clubs}. The player on the button (BTN) calls as well, and the blinds fold. There’s $24 in the pot.

The flop comes {6-Spades}{5-Spades}{4-Spades}.

It checks to me and I bet $10. BTN calls and UTG folds. The pot is now $44.

The turn brings the {10-Hearts}.

Hmmm... (I think). I’d better check because I would not know what to do if I bet and he raised. If he’s slow playing a flush, I do not want to be blown off of my two-outer. I’ll just check and call his bet.

I check. He checks behind. The pot is still $44.

The river is the {8-Spades}.

Bink! I rivered the nuts. If he called my flop bet with a big spade, I should be able to win a big pot. If I bet here, he may just call with the {K-Spades}, raise the {A-Spades}, and fold hands without a spade. If I check, he will bet his strong flushes for value and may even decide to bluff with a non-flush since I have played the hand so weakly. With a hand this strong, I think I have to take a chance and go for a check-raise to build a bigger pot.

I check. He instantly checks behind, shows {A-Hearts}{K-Spades}, and reaches for the pot. He looks very confused when I show my straight flush.

Really? How on Earth do you check behind with the king-high flush? I mean, all I’ve done so far is take a weak stab at the flop and check two streets. Unreal. This kinda feels like a bad beat. What a waste!

The Problem
First off, I should not have been so passive with my hand on the turn. Sure, my pair plus a weak flush draw was not that impressive, but having the open-ended straight flush draw to back it up gave me plenty of equity to call a turn raise. I was ahead of most hands in his range and would have been getting the right price to call many others if he had made a reasonably sized raise. The only hand that had me crushed was a made flush, which likely would have raised on the flop.

Secondly, I underestimated the unreasonable fear that many small stakes players have of flush cards as well as how much they love to show down their hands. Thin value bets on the river — such as I was hoping my opponent to make here — are simply not commonplace in these games. This is especially true when four cards to a flush are on the board.

I might add that this player is not particularly good and is even a bit on the tight side. In other words, I should have considered that there was a chance he would check back with the {K-Spades}. For him and players like him, the pain of losing to a better hand trumps the joy of getting a river bet paid off.

The Lesson
I will give myself a bit of credit here. It is good that I considered the possibility of getting raised on the turn before blindly betting a marginal hand. However, I overestimated how bad it would be for me if the raise happened. I should have been looking for excuses to bet instead of excuses not to bet.

Aggressive poker is winning poker. In the future, I should err on the side of betting a little too often instead of not often enough.